
Let me count the ways: An integrative theory of love and hate

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Abstract

We propose an integrative theory of love and hate intended to help resolve problems and inconsistencies that have emerged from previous conceptualizations. We suggest that love is a motive based on the valuing of the other and is associated with the goal of preserving or promoting the other's well-being. Likewise, hate is a motive based on devaluing the other and is associated with the goal of diminishing or destroying the other's well-being. We further suggest that intense, powerful emotions may serve as eliciting experiences for different types of love and hate, and we discuss how benefiting or harming the other can be either an instrumental or an ultimate goal for the various forms of love and hate. Finally, we discuss some ways in which our theory can promote new directions in the future study of love and hate.

As a high school student one of us missed a science class on the day when the teacher started a unit on energy. In the classes that followed, the forms, properties, and functions of energy were discussed but there was always a sense of being disadvantaged because the other students had been present for the critical first class in which the all-important definitional information about energy had been revealed—they knew what energy *is*. Only later was it made clear that the essential nature of energy had never been described because it was not known.

This parallels the study of love in many ways. There have been novels, treatises, sermons, poems, songs, dramas, and works of art centered on the experiences and effects of love. To this chorus, social scientists have

added their own growing voice; yet love as a concept has proven notoriously difficult to define. It seems that, as with energy, we know a lot about what love does, but we are much less clear about what love *is*. The same is true of our understanding of hate.

As a means of framing our own conceptualizations of love and hate, we will first briefly discuss some of the limitations we see in previous conceptualizations. Given the limited space available, we are aware of the risk of oversimplifying or giving insufficient credit to the important, often groundbreaking, work that has preceded our own. Our ultimate goal, however, is to build on the points of agreement in previous works by proposing a conceptual framework that both organizes and integrates the existing literature on love and hate.

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Regarding Love

A thorough review and analysis of the rich literature on love is well beyond the scope of this article. Before we consider what love is, however, it seems useful to make some distinctions that highlight what love is not.

Love is not a loving relationship. It is not uncommon for people to define love by referring to the qualities of a “loving” relationship. Prototype analyses of love (e.g., Fehr, 1988) have regularly identified trust as one of love’s central features, even though trust reflects the confidence that one is *loved* by the partner (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). The tendency to integrate distinct relational constructs into a definition of love also appears in theoretical models of love, as when Sternberg (1986) includes “commitment” as a component of his triangular model of love. Although love, trust, and commitment are important elements of a “loving” relationship, psychologically they are separate constructs.

Love is not loving behavior. Just as it is questionable to equate love with a specific form of close relationship, so it seems problematic to focus on behavior as the essence of love. Behavior, loving or otherwise, is often multiply determined. Thus, although prosocial behavior may be an outward display of an internal loving state, it may also be driven by a sense of duty, reciprocity norms, or other factors. As a case in point, Lee’s (1973) typology of love styles includes *ludus*, a game-playing type of love in which the beloved is often manipulated and used. Although some relationships may take a ludic form, it is difficult to see how manipulation cloaked in a prosocial guise can be characterized as love. Thus, it is important to distinguish “loving” behaviors from love itself.

Love is not an emotion. There is near-universal agreement among laypersons (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987) and scholars alike (e.g., Damasio, 2002) that love is something that people *feel*, that is, a distinct emotion. Indeed, Shaver, Morgan, and Wu (1996) assert that love should be considered a basic emotion—a distinct, universal, biologically based experience. However, because emotions are not long-term dispositions but temporary responses designed to alert an organism to internal or external changes (Damasio), it seems problematic to label the long-term response patterns that characterize love as emotions and

thereby equate them with physiologically based, episodic emotional reactions. Moreover, there does not seem to be a single unified emotional experience characterizing love. Shaver et al. (1996) describe how certain facial expressions may be associated with a tender form of love, whereas erotic feelings of love may be associated with a different set of facial expressions, for example. Thus, love seems to be reflected in multiple emotions rather than one distinct emotion.

So ... what is love? Despite clear differences in the ways that love has been defined, on some things there is general agreement. First, most theorists characterize love as a multifaceted construct with multiple meanings, diverse targets, and varied expressions (e.g., Berscheid & Meyers, 1996; Lee, 1973; Sternberg, 1986). Indeed, even when characterized as an adaptive, evolved bond, love is regarded as a manifestation of multiple motivational systems (e.g., the attachment system, the caregiving system, and the sexual attraction system; see Bowlby, 1969, 1979; Hazan & Shaver, 1994). Thus, in the same way that energy is a unified entity with multiple, distinct manifestations (e.g., heat, light, and motion), love is a construct that appears in varied forms.

In an intriguing philosophical analysis of love, Johnson (2001) has offered four additional points on which most students of love will agree. First, love has an object. Thus, love is something that moves out from us toward something, typically someone, else. Second, we value that which we love. Thus, love has something to do with the process of valuing the love object. Third, the lover is drawn or inclined toward the love object. Thus, there is a motivational component to love. Finally, there is an affective component to love—the lover must feel something for or with the love object.

If these points seem comparatively self-evident, such is the nature of things on which there is general agreement. Convergent opinions may nevertheless serve as a prudent starting point for trying to identify a common core to the diversity of experiences that

people label *love*. Based on this foundation, we understand love to be a *motivational state in which the goal is to preserve and promote the well-being of the valued object*.

In characterizing love as a motive, we emphasize a critical distinction between *evaluation* and *valuing*. An evaluation, the defining characteristic of an attitude (e.g., Zanna & Rempel, 1988), is an objective judgment of positivity or negativity. Thus, even though a number of theorists have defined love as an attitude (e.g., Noller, 1996; Rubin, 1973), the concept of attitude may correspond better with liking than with love. Compared to liking, love, in whatever form, seems more engaging, more compelling, and less dispassionate. Thus, valuing is more than an evaluative assessment: It has motivational implications, focusing the lover on the goal of benefiting the love object.

If love is a motive based on valuing the other, then how do we make sense of the various types of love that many theorists have identified? Moreover, how does seeing love as a motive in any way capture the depth and intensity of love as it is reflected in people's lived reality? The answer, we suggest, lies in the different experiences that can lead to the other being valued. We believe that the motivational character of love is rooted in a set of formative experiences that are often intensely emotional, and sometimes transformatively profound. Such emotion-laden, personally meaningful experiences energize the love motive in its various forms.

Regarding Hate

Before discussing further the details and implications of our conceptualization of love as a motive, we turn to a consideration of hate, which is often explicitly or implicitly discussed as the converse of love (e.g., Frijda, 1994; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Indeed, the very word "hate" captures the essence of intense experiential states among laypersons almost as often as does love (e.g., Fehr & Russell, 1984). Moreover, hate has been regarded as an important but understudied aspect of human experience in its own right (e.g., Blum, 1997; Fitness, 2000).

Notwithstanding hate's potential importance, the extant literature in which hate is identified as a construct of interest, even in passing, is fragmented and scattered across three very different traditions: (a) psychoanalysis, in which hate is discussed in predominantly interpersonal, often familial, contexts (e.g., Blum, 1997; Kernberg, 1995); (b) social psychology, in which it is seen in predominantly intergroup terms, often equated with prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1950; Brewer, 1999) or destructive behaviors such as hate crimes (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2001) and genocide (Kressel, 1996); and (c) basic emotion research (e.g., Ben-Ze'ev, 2000; Fitness, 2000; Frijda, 1994; Shaver et al., 1987). Examination of this diverse literature reveals a number of common themes, as well as noteworthy inconsistencies, across previous conceptual analyses of hate.

The stability of hate. First, a number of sources straightforwardly characterize hate as "chronic and stable" (Kernberg, 1992, p. 215; see also Akhtar, 1995) or "persistent and enduring" (Litwinski, 1945, p. 87). Others indirectly affirm this characterization by classifying hate as representative of known, stable constructs. For example, both Allport (1950) and Frijda (1994) referred to hate (as well as love) as sentiments—which, at least according to Allport, can serve as frameworks for orienting one's life. Izard (1977) likewise referred to hate as an affective-cognitive orientation. Brewer (1999) identified "outgroup hatred" and "ingroup love" as independent components of prejudice, and Pedahzur and Yishai (1999) explicitly operationalized hate in terms of discrimination and social distance. Moreover, even when conceptualizing hate as an emotion, authors sometimes slip into other terminology to address the stability issue: "Hatred is a long-term attitude ... [or] a long-term sentiment ..." (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000, p. 381). Given the characterization of hate as stable and enduring, it is instructive to note that empirical research demonstrating hate's relative stability is nearly nonexistent (but see Flett, Boase, McAndrews, Pliner, & Blankstein, 1986).

Hate as an emotion. Certainly a large part of the extant literature treats hate as an emotion, thereby implying that it is a relatively unstable state, at least as compared to attitudes and sentiments (but see Ben-Ze'ev, 2000, as noted above). There is considerable diversity of opinion as to what sort of emotion hate is, however. In some instances, hate is simply identified as an emotion, with little effort devoted either to defining it or to differentiating it from other emotions (e.g., Eissler, 2000; Flett et al., 1986). Others conceptualize hate as a global, negative evaluation, often contrasted with love (Ben-Ze'ev; Ortony et al., 1988; Parish, 1988; Sokolowski, 1992). Many regard hate as similar enough to the cluster of anger-related emotions to be considered either a subtype or to require effortful differentiation therefrom (Ben-Ze'ev; Darwin, 1872/1955; Fitness, 2000; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Frijda, 1994; Pao, 1965; Parens, 1992; Shaver et al., 1987; Wiener, 1998). Hate has been thought to be a composite of anger and fear (Kemper, 1978), or of anger, disgust, and contempt (Izard, 1977), or to include a fear component while being distinguishable from anger, disgust, contempt, and envy (Ben-Ze'ev). Sternberg (2003) maintains that hate is an emotion in his recent model and suggests that distinct subtypes of hate originate from various composites of disgust (negation of intimacy), contempt (devaluation/diminution), and anger/fear (passion). Clearly, many scholars agree that hate is an emotion, but their claims concerning its precise nature are varied and sometimes contradictory.

The motivational implications of hate. A final theme evident in the literature is that hate has motivational implications: It provides motive force (Blum, 1997) that focuses the individual (Akhtar, 1995; Pao, 1965). Although occasionally self-directed (Joiner, Gencoz, Gencoz, Metalsky, & Rudd, 2001), it is more often interpersonal/relational (Akhtar; Blum; Fitness, 2000; Flett et al., 1986; Holtgraves & Raymond, 1995; Pao). Specifically, hate is associated with the desire to hurt or destroy the other (Allport, 1950;

Ben-Ze'ev, 2000; Blum; Eissler, 2000; Frijda, 1994; Izard; 1977; Litwinski, 1945; Moss, 2001; Wiener, 1998).

So ... what is hate? In summary, the extant literature yields substantial differences of opinion regarding the nature of hate. It is unclear, for example, as to whether hate is best regarded as relatively stable, as a transient state, or as both. Moreover, there is little consensus as to whether hate is an emotion—and if it is, of what sort. Clearly, the point in least dispute is that hate has motivational implications relating to the desire to hurt or destroy the other.

We would suggest that the latter point can be affirmed, and the former points resolved, by drawing conceptual parallels between hate and love. Love is linked to valuing the other; hate is linked to devaluing the other. Thus, just as we earlier conceptualized love as the motive associated with the goal of preserving or promoting the object's well-being, so we suggest that hate is *a motive associated with the goal of destroying or diminishing the object's well-being*. This conceptualization bears some resemblance to the conceptualization of aggression as “any behavior directed toward another individual that is carried out with the *proximate* (immediate) intent to cause harm” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 28, emphasis in original), but the two are conceptually distinct: Aggression is a behavior, whereas hate is a motive.

An Integrative Theory of Love and Hate

We have presented overviews of the conceptual and empirical literatures on love and hate. Of the two, the love literature is certainly more focused and extensive. The hate literature has proven to be much more disparate and, except for a handful of psychoanalytic works (e.g., Galdston, 1987; Kernberg, 1995; Schoenewolf, 1991; Suttie, 1935/1988) and a recent mainstream article (Sternberg, 2003), a formal theory of hate has yet to be proposed. Notwithstanding their differing degrees of theoretical grounding, noteworthy conceptual ambiguity continues to surround

both love and hate, ambiguity that we believe our motivational analysis can address.

Application of goal-related principles. Our fundamental premise that love and hate are motives has a number of important implications. To begin with, by applying classic motivational principles such as goal attainment, goal substitution, and goal interruption, discrepancies among previous treatments of love and hate can be resolved. The principle of goal interruption may be especially useful in explaining why hate has been characterized as stable rather than transient at times (e.g., Kernberg, 1992; Litwinski, 1945). Theoretically speaking, love and hate can both be transient if adequately behaviorally discharged through goal attainment or goal substitution, or stable in cases where the motive has not been discharged. However, given that preserving and promoting the other's well-being is an ongoing task, love has no practical end point (unless one allows certain metaphysical conceptualizations of perfection, bliss, or eternal rest). Hate, in contrast, may have a definable end point in some instances, that is, the total annihilation of the other.

Of course, the realization of hate's goal by destroying or diminishing the other's well-being is frequently thwarted by (often severe) social constraints. Ben-Ze'ev (2000), for example, observed that "[i]n light of the more negative moral value of hate, people readily admit that they are angry, but are less inclined to admit that they hate someone. In the spirit of hate the sin, never the sinner,' people often deny that their negative attitude toward someone is a case of personal hate. Even God is described as being angry with people rather than hating them" (p. 401). Thus, because there are fewer social restrictions, people may express emotions such as anger. In contrast, as a motive with a goal that is well defined but often condemned, hate may linger, unexpressed.

Love can be analyzed similarly. If one values the other primarily as a source of passionate excitement, for example, but pursuit of that goal is thwarted by the other's disinterested or rejecting behavior, the lover desir-

ing passion may maintain an intense, ongoing desire for the unattainable beloved. Alternatively, the rejected lover may seek to satisfy this goal elsewhere, such that goal interruption, in effect, leads to goal substitution.

The principle of goal substitution may be particularly useful for differentiating love and hate from antecedent emotional states such as excitement or anger. For example, although provocation resulting in anger has been the most frequently implicated antecedent of interpersonal aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), hate is not a necessary consequence of experiencing anger (e.g., Shaver et al., 1987). If hate is not elicited, then any of a number of behaviors may suffice to mollify one's anger (e.g., distracting oneself, smashing an object, or attempting to hurt the other). In contrast, if hate is elicited, then the behavioral options are much more limited—only behaviors congruent with the goal of destroying or diminishing the other's well-being would be effective in discharging hate. Distraction should be quite ineffective; smashing an object would only be effective if doing so caused injury to the other, be it physical (e.g., if the object was smashed against the other's body) or psychological (e.g., the other's feeling loss due to the destruction of valued personal property or feeling terrorized by such a violent act).

Instrumental and ultimate forms of love and hate. We suggest that there are multiple forms of the love and hate motives, with distinctions among their associated goals paralleling those of instrumental (or proximal) goals and ultimate goals made in both the prosocial behavior literature (Batson, 1991) and the aggression literature (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). That is, both preserving/promoting and destroying/diminishing the other's well-being can function either as a means to self-focused ends such as threat reduction or pleasure or as other-focused ends in themselves.

It is important to distinguish self-focused ends in which the other's well-being is promoted or diminished from self-focused ends in which the other is irrelevant or not salient. Interactions or relationships in which the

ultimate goal is economic best illustrate this distinction. For instance, although a plumber responding to a late-night flooding emergency unquestionably benefits the homeowner in need, we suspect that the homeowner does not confuse the motive behind the plumber's late-night bailout with love, especially upon receipt of the bill. On the flip side, consider a professional assassin who kills someone for monetary gain. As an intentional act of harm directed toward a nonconsenting other, this clearly qualifies as aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), yet we would not consider it to be hate motivated if the killing is "just another job," for it suggests that any individuating characteristics of the victim are entirely irrelevant with respect to goal attainment.

Emotional experiences as antecedents of love and hate. We expect other-oriented emotions to be the experiential antecedents of the love and hate motives in their instrumental and ultimate forms. Consistent with this assertion, Batson, Turk, Shaw, and Klein (1995) have made a compelling case for the information function of emotions in interpersonal situations, offering evidence, for example, that the experience of empathy for another person tells us how much we value the other's well-being (which, within our conceptual framework, is tantamount to loving the other). We extend Batson et al.'s analysis further by suggesting that specific emotions, such as empathy or admiration, may function as eliciting experiences that map onto specific forms of love, and emotions such as fear or contempt may map onto distinct forms of hate.

In addition, given that multiple, other-oriented emotions may be experienced within a particular context, multiple forms of love and hate may be operative; indeed, even in a close relationship, a person may toggle back and forth between love and hate. Such an assertion does not compromise the conceptual purity of the various forms of love and hate but rather underscores the fact that behavior labeled as "loving" or "hating" is often multiply determined. Batson (1991) makes a similar point: Help offered to a person

in need is seldom the result of "pure" motivation; rather, it is more often motivated by any of a number of egoistic motives, such as seeking praise or avoiding guilt, as well as by the altruistic motive of improving the other's well-being as an end in itself (Bushman & Anderson, 2001, make the same point with respect to aggression).

Circumstantial bridging between emotions and love/hate. Although specific emotional experiences can function as elicitors of love and hate, neither motive is an inevitable consequence. Rather, for love or hate to result from a given emotional experience, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the would-be loved or hated other must be perceived to be the cause of one's emotional experience. Second, as a consequence of this attribution of responsibility, the other must be either valued or devalued—in effect, deemed worthy or unworthy. The desire to preserve/promote (love) or diminish/destroy (hate) the well-being of the other subsequently emerges from this appraisal process.

Importantly, it is this antecedent process of valuing or devaluing that gives love and hate their motivational character distinct from liking and disliking. For example, one may simply wish to avoid, or perhaps ignore, a disliked other, whereas one will—by definition—wish to harm a hated other. Similarly, although one may enjoy the presence of liked others without any behavioral compunction toward them, loved others must be cherished. Put simply, love and hate propel the individual toward the other in ways that liking and disliking do not.

The conditions under which emotional experiences result in valuing or devaluing and, thus, love or hate depend on the time frame. We suspect that the more immediate elicitation of love or hate occurs when the antecedent emotional experience is especially intense, for the accompanying arousal may narrow the focus of attention (Easterbrook, 1959), thereby increasing the likelihood of the other being perceived as the unmitigated cause of one's intense experience. A narrowed focus of attention may also decrease the salience of behavioral response alternatives

not directed toward the other. So, for example, intense anger may be associated with an undifferentiated negative appraisal of the motives and character of the offending other, resulting in the desire for immediate retaliation that may even put oneself and innocent others at risk, as in instances of road rage (Lupton, 2002). In contrast, the other's role in one's aversive experience may not be perceived immediately, but rather discovered or inferred after some time has passed. In such an instance, the memory of the original emotional experience and its repercussions may be called to mind, along with (re)interpretations of the offending other's behavior before, as well as after the incident, thereby facilitating the global (de)valuation of the other. Thus, whether by the focusing power of intense arousal or by the assembly of "proven facts" about the other that is subject to distortion (e.g., McDonald & Hirt, 1997; Nickerson, 1998), judgments regarding the worth or worthlessness of the other become convictions that fuel the motives of love and hate.

We now turn to an explication of specific forms of love and hate, discussing conceptual parallels in terms of their eliciting experiences and associated goals (see Table 1 for an overview).

Specific forms of love and hate

Erotic love. Fisher, Aron, Mashek, Li, and Brown (2002) have argued that humans have evolved an attraction system that is designed to focus energy and attention on a preferred mating partner. This attraction is characterized by an emotionally intense passionate desire and longing for the preferred mate. Virtually all societies recognize the existence of such intense attraction (Jankowiak & Fisher, 1992), and essentially every typology of love has a category for such passionate longing (e.g., Eros, romantic love, passionate love). Furthermore, Berscheid and Meyers (1996) have shown that people are readily able to differentiate between loving someone and being "in love" with someone. According to these researchers, a key aspect of being in love is the desire for a sexual relationship with the beloved. This would be

expected given that sexual activity is integral to the mating process. However, Fisher et al. (2002) have recently measured neurochemical and neural activity (using functional magnetic resonance imaging) that shows that this attraction system is distinct from sexual arousal or lust. Thus, erotic love involves a powerful attraction for a desirable sexual partner, not a powerful attraction for sexual activity per se—the desire is for the person, not the act.

The feelings of attraction that typify erotic love involve intense, often uncontrollable, emotional responses to the loved one. This emotional arousal may be based on sexual excitement (Regan & Berscheid, 1999), rapidly changing levels of intimate disclosure (Baumeister & Bratslavsky, 1999), desire and longing to be physically present with the loved one (Hatfield & Rapson, 1993), or misattributed arousal from other sources (Dutton & Aron, 1974), but it is inevitably the basis for the powerful emotional experience that characterizes erotic love. Consequently, we understand erotic love to be an intense longing for a sexual and emotional union with a desirable mate. As an instrumental form of love, the other is valued—indeed, even idealized—because she/he is the source of this often intensely rewarding and pleasurable desire. Preserving and promoting the loved other's well-being thus allows one's own desires for sexual and emotional union to be perpetuated.

Sadism. Just as pleasure, arousal, and excitement may typify the experience of erotic passion and the associated desire for intimate contact with the loved other, intense rewards and pleasures may be experienced in relation to anticipated or actual interaction with the hated other—provided that that interaction causes the hated other to suffer. At its core, such hate is sadistic, as numerous psychoanalytic writers have observed (e.g., Blum, 1997; Galdston, 1987; Kernberg, 1990, 1992, 1995; Wiener, 1998). Whether via nonconsensual physical contact or some other form of intimate invasion, sadistic hate is clearly instrumental, with the ultimate goal being pleasure or thrill at the other's expense.

Table 1. Forms of love and hate and their associated eliciting experiences and ultimate goals

Love		Hate	
Valuing: proximal goal of preserving/ promoting the other's well-being		Devaluing: proximal goal of destroying/ diminishing the other's well-being	
Type of love	Example eliciting experiences	Type of hate	Example eliciting experiences
	Ultimate goal		Ultimate goal
Erotic	Arousal, desire excitement	Sadism	Excitement, thrill-seeking
Dependence	Insecurity, deficiency	Mutiny	Resentment, feeling trapped
Enrichment	Security, comfort, self-expansion	Tethering	Fear, loss, abandonment
Companionate	Enjoyment, shared activities	Denigration	Envy, contempt
Regard	Admiration, approval	Redress	Anger, disgust violation
Altruistic	Empathy, caring, responsiveness	Nihilistic	Loathing
	Union with a desired mate		Pleasure
	Nurturance		Asserting autonomy
	Enhancement		Secure relationship
	Mutuality		Self-elevation
	Identification, social approval		Restoring order
	Other's well-being		Other's harm

Mild behavioral indicators of sadistic hate are sometimes observed in interpersonal contexts when someone confesses a desire to behave negatively toward others “just to see the look on their face” or “just to see them squirm.” Extreme behavioral indicators include the pre-mortem torture enacted by some serial killers (Simon, 1996) as well as certain hate crimes in which the primary motive for beating or killing a victim is thrill-seeking and fun (McDevitt et al., 2001).

Dependence. Maslow (1962) and others in the humanistic psychological tradition have identified deficiency-motivated love—a love based on *need*. Rubin’s (1973) groundbreaking work also included need as a component of love, as did Kelley’s (1983) discussion of love. A sense of dependency upon a relationship, born out of need, is also captured in concepts such as the preoccupied attachment style (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991), the manic love style (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986), limerence (Tennov, 1998), and love addiction (Carnes, 1991). Because the other is valued based on his/her capacity to assuage a sense of neediness typified by feelings of insecurity, deficiency, or inadequacy, need-based love is often regarded as a lesser form of love. Its instrumental nature is readily apparent: Closeness and the desire to preserve the other often assume the form of a demanding, clinging urgency. Thus, even in an adult relationship, dependence manifests as a plea for nurturance, for the ongoing soothing of one’s felt deficiencies by the loved other.

Mutiny. Just as strong feelings of dependence or need can foster an obsessive, clinging preoccupation with the other, so can a context of enforced dependence create feelings of resentment and exasperation that may provoke a desire to harm the other, as in caregiving situations with little respite that episodically evoke a sense of being “trapped.” In such instances, the ultimate goal associated with the urge to harm the other may be to rebel against the inflexibility of the role to which one has been assigned (cf. Beck, 2002) and to reassert one’s autonomy or identity as

distinct from the relationship with the other (Kernberg, 1990). As a mother interviewed by Parker (1995) put it: "I can remember hurling the baby down on the pillows once, and just screaming, and not caring. I wanted to kill him really.... I just wanted to get away from the situation. I felt unable to tolerate it. I hated the baby for constantly being there" (p. 19). Although the admission of such thoughts, however fleeting, is considered taboo and often met with repugnance in a child-friendly Western culture (e.g., Dozier, 2002), historical analysis of the extent to which children have been subject to abuse, torture, and homicide by designated caregivers suggests that the wholesale disavowal of such intents is a rather recent development (deMause, 2001).

In the psychoanalytic literature, mutiny is embedded in the concept of ambivalence, which can be experienced by the dependent toward the caregiver (Blum, 1997; Kernberg, 1992; Parens, 1992) or by the caregiver toward the dependent (Parker, 1995; Piven, 2001). In ambivalence, love and hate toward the other are hypothesized to alternate or even coexist. Mutiny does not presuppose the existence of love, however, but only a dependent relationship. Thus, we suspect that any relational context—be it intimate, familial, or professional—in which care must be administered or received under difficult conditions or for a prolonged period of time has the potential for evoking episodes of mutiny among one or both parties. Indeed, some of the psychoanalytic insights regarding the nature of hate have emerged via the analyst's recognition of his or her murderous thoughts toward vexing, unruly clients (e.g., Winnicott, 1949, as cited in Blum, 1997). Situations involving chronic custodial care due to long-term physical or mental disability may likewise elicit mutiny; for example, see Glendenning (1997), Phillips, de Ardon, and Briones (2000), and Pillemer and Bachman-Prehn (1991) for a discussion of mutiny-related issues in elder care settings.

Enrichment. Interpersonal benefits are not only provided in the context of deficiency and neediness. Partners may also be a source of

physical or emotional security to those who are operating from a position of strength. We have already described how preoccupied attachment may be associated with valuing from a position of need. In the same way, a partner or parent can foster a secure attachment. According to Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), the attachment system evolved as a means for infants and caregivers to form and maintain a secure, protective relationship, one that provides a refuge in times of trouble and a safe base from which to venture out when the danger has passed. As a caregiver consistently satisfies these inborn needs, the attachment bond negates fears stemming from the prospect of loss and abandonment and results in a sense of felt security. This internalized sense of security can be carried forward into adulthood (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987); the secure individual therefore need not approach adult relationships from a position of deficiency, as is the case in dependent love. Rather, the secure partner is motivated to preserve and promote the other's satisfaction, happiness, and well-being in order to ensure the other's continued availability as a safe haven, but without the sense of obsessive, clinging desperation that characterizes dependent love.

Moreover, the attachment framework makes clear that a secure attachment creates a safe haven from which the infant or adult can venture out to explore the world. Indeed, the important role that a partner can play in enriching the life of one who is already operating from a position of comparative strength has been underscored in other influential theories of love. Aron and Aron (1986), in particular, argue that a partner can help satisfy an individual's motive for self-expansion. Thus, ultimate goals involving self-enhancement and continued personal well-being can provide a powerful context for the proximal goal of preserving and promoting the other's well-being. Enrichment is thus an instrumental form of love, but one in which the valued other's provisions are regarded more as amenity than as subsistence.

Tethering. Because meaningful, rewarding relationships with others are a fundamental

human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), relationship threats may evoke a variety of threat-reducing responses, according to the perceived power of the threat source: Powerful others may elicit appeasement, equal others may elicit negotiation, and weak or inferior others may be targeted for domination (cf. Kipnis, 1976; see also Kernberg, 1992). At first glance, the latter seems nonsensical: How can an other perceived as weak or inferior also be perceived as a threat to one's security? We suspect that this is most likely when the other is one with whom the perceiver shares a connection, such as an intimate partner, and whose threatening capacity lies in the risk that she/he will abandon or betray the perceiver (e.g., Vandello & Cohen, 2003). In such instances, tethering—disabling the other through physical, psychological, and/or economic means—may emerge with the ultimate goal of forestalling the other's departure, thereby preserving one's own sense of security. In other words, the intent is to render the other either incapable of leaving or sufficiently dismayed by the potential consequences that leaving is no longer regarded as a viable option.

As was the case for mutiny, tethering was presaged by psychoanalysts who conceptualized hate as intimately connected with the loss of a love relationship. For example, Schoenewolf (1991) stated that "hate may be defined as the pain and aggression associated with separation" (p. 3) and that "[t]o hate somebody is to express an intense need for them that has been frustrated" (p. 14; see also Pao, 1965; Suttie, 1935/1988; Wiener, 1998). Unlike mutiny, in which hate can be interpreted as a reaction against dependence intended to differentiate self from other, tethering is intended to keep the other close.

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of tethering comes from the literature on domestic abuse and stalking. Douglas and Dutton (2001; see also Dutton, 1998), for example, suggested that a considerable amount of violent or otherwise terrorizing behavior directed toward current or estranged intimates is attributable to perpetrators who manifest a borderline personality organization. Such an individual

relies on the intimate other to sustain his or her sense of self. When the partner leaves or threatens to leave, this may be received as devastating to the self in that one's ego will disintegrate along with the loss of the partner. This manifests in increasing demands, anger, and abusiveness. There may be an elevated attempt to control the partner. The abuser may be depressed and anxious. If the partner has left, vestigial control may be experienced through stalking. Such stalking may temporarily suppress anxiety-dysphoric states. (p. 539)

Moreover, as Douglas and Dutton note, this conceptualization has considerable empirical support in the domain of domestic abuse; application of the model to stalking has yet to be tested directly, but it seems quite plausible.

Companionate love. Friendship love, brotherly love, or *Storge* (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986) is a commonly identified form of love that includes many of the characteristics of close couple relationships without the passionate-sexual dimension (Berscheid & Meyers, 1996). In a study of children and adolescents, Youniss (1986) identified reciprocity as the hallmark of friendship, and such mutuality can be experienced in terms of shared interests and activities, self-disclosure, warmth and affection, and understanding and acceptance. A number of theorists (e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Sternberg, 1986) have labeled this long-term expression of companionship, intimacy, and mutual affirmation as companionate love. Friendship or companionate love, therefore, has as its ultimate goal the maintenance and promotion of a cooperative, mutually rewarding relationship.

Denigration. Just as shared or cooperative activities with rewarding outcomes can give rise to feelings of liking and enjoyment and a sense of companionate affection for another person, so can competitive, zero-sum activities give rise to feelings of envy and contempt and the corresponding desires to "bring down" or "keep down" the other, collectively labeled *denigration*. Unlike

mutiny and tethering, denigration does not assume a prior interactional context involving dependence, but one in which there is perceived competition for a desired outcome that is scarce or exclusive, such as parental approval, a job promotion, romantic exclusivity, or social status. In such situations, rivals perceived as more successful than oneself may evoke feelings of envy and the desire to negate the other's advantage (e.g., Ben-Ze'ev, 2000; Kernberg, 1995; Vitz & Mango, 1997), either through direct competition or confrontation or through indirect methods such as gossip (Rosnow, 2001). If one feels shamed or humiliated, reactions to the other may be particularly severe (cf. Fitness, 2000; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993).

When the rival is perceived as less successful than oneself, feelings of contempt may predominate (Darwin, 1872/1955), with denigration most likely emerging when the other threatens to equal or surpass oneself (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000). For example, belief in male superiority combined with being underemployed or feeling "shown up" by one's partner has been shown to predict domestic violence and marital rape among heterosexual couples (Baumeister, 1997).

Denigration may be evident at the intergroup level as well. "Hate" is often used as a synonym for prejudice and intergroup aggression (e.g., Allport, 1950; Brewer, 1999; Clarke, 1999; Gruen, 1999; Izard, 1977; Kressel, 1996; Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999), and the belief that one's own group is competing for scarce resources with one or more increasingly demanding out-groups has been implicated as a causal contributor to prejudice and discrimination (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). At the extreme, McDevitt et al. (2001) note that the motive for so-called defensive hate crimes "stems from an overall defensive posture maintained by an individual against a particular group (or groups) of people who are considered a growing threat to resources and a cause of problems occurring in the life of the offender" (p. 311).

Regard. In most Western societies people choose their own mates. As a result, the

qualities and characteristics of potential partners become important selection material. Although the extent to which people actually rely on their catalog of desirable partner qualities when they are attracted to and choose a partner is open to question, there is no doubt that the vast majority of people have such a "shopping list." Sociobiologists (e.g., Buss, 1995) have suggested that this list includes qualities that foster reproductive success, such as physical appearance for women and the ability to protect and provide for men, but valued interpersonal qualities such as honesty and kindness typically make the strongest showings. Thus, in a close relationship context, regard stems from a constellation of eliciting experiences linked to the observed positive qualities of the loved one. Consequently, the lover's intentions to benefit the loved other can be seen as instrumental in obtaining the social approval and personal satisfaction that comes from being connected to such a "good catch."

Beyond the close relationship context, regard can be observed in the phenomenon of "hero worship," for the hero's well-being may be valued highly even though the worshipper may have never actually met him or her (e.g., Klapp, 1949). In such instances, being identified with or connected to the esteemed other—however remotely—conveys special status onto the lover, as in the "basking in reflected glory" phenomenon (Cialdini et al., 1976). Indeed, this conveyance of special virtue is often an implicit benefit bestowed upon adherents of theistic faith traditions who identify with the object of their worship and respond with praise and adoration. In all cases, objects of regard are clearly valued for the qualities that they embody, yet regard is also clearly instrumental, with the ultimate goal(s) of identification and/or social approval.

Redress. As we have already noted, anger and hate are linked frequently in the hate literature (Averill, 1982; Beck, 2002; Fitness, 2000; Frijda, 1994; Izard, 1977; Kemper, 1978; Kressel, 1996; Litwinski, 1945; Parens, 1992; Shaver et al., 1987; Wiener, 1998). The link seems to emerge from humans'

preoccupation with integrity, justice, and fairness, as embodied in a basic belief that oneself and “good” people like oneself deserve good things and do not deserve bad things (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Lerner & Miller, 1978). When bad things do happen to those perceived as undeserving (especially oneself), anger and a sense of injustice result, along with the desire to punish or exact revenge upon the perpetrators. The close relationship context often amplifies the impact of interpersonal offenses such as betrayal, so clemency is by no means a guarantee if the offending other is one’s relationship partner (Fitness, 2001). The desire to retaliate for perceived injustices emerges in organizational (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) and intergroup (e.g., Galdston, 1987; McDevitt et al., 2001) contexts as well.

Not all offenses can be logically or convincingly argued to have inflicted harm or injury, however—for example, sexual behaviors that are consensual and pose no health risk but are nevertheless morally condemned (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). In such instances, the violation is more symbolic than literal, involving a predominant reaction of disgust rather than anger (Izard, 1977; Moss, 2001; see also Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Violators are therefore dealt with in terms of their perceived capacity to corrupt or contaminate (Beck, 2002; Clarke, 1999; Gruen, 1999): The greater this perceived capacity, the greater the likelihood that “exile, elimination, or disappearance” will be regarded as “appropriate measures” (Moss, 2001, p. 1330). Thus, redress can be inspired by both anger-eliciting harm and disgust-eliciting contamination, and its ultimate goal is restoring order, whether by balancing the scales of justice or by cleansing a personal world that has become impure. It therefore seems far from accidental that the capacity of enemies to harm and contaminate is a recurrent theme in wartime propaganda across cultures (Keen, 1986).

Altruistic love. Altruistic love or *Agape* (e.g., Post, 2002) is characterized by a selfless, other-oriented compassion. Of all the types of love that we have presented, altruis-

tic love can be considered “pure” in that the proximal and ultimate goals are the same: benefiting the other. Any collateral self-benefit is unintended and/or unanticipated. According to Batson (1991), the altruistic nature of behavior intended to promote or preserve the well-being of another cannot be judged by the magnitude of positive outcomes for the person in need nor by the apparent costs and rewards incurred by the helper. The key issue is whether the ultimate goal is to contribute to the other’s well-being. Over the past 30 years, Batson and colleagues have amassed an impressive program of research suggesting that altruistic motivation indeed exists and that the eliciting experience is empathy—an emotional state typified by feelings of tenderness, compassion, warmth, and so forth directed toward the other. Although not without its controversies, this line of research suggests that the emotional experience of empathy is the foundation of a motive oriented toward the ultimate goal of preserving and promoting the other’s well being.

Nihilism. Just as it is possible to seek to preserve or promote the other’s well-being as an ultimate goal, so it is possible to seek to destroy or diminish the other’s well-being as an ultimate goal. Thus, as the counterpart of compassionate love or altruistic motivation, we propose the existence of nihilistic hate, elicited by a loathing of the other and typified by a sense of the necessity of the other’s injury, suffering, or complete demise.

Definitive demonstration of an ultimate goal can prove notoriously difficult in interpersonal settings (see, e.g., Batson, 1991). Intending the other’s complete demise, as in nihilism, seems incommensurate with the ultimate goals associated with instrumental forms of hate, however. For example, the other is eliminated as a possible love object (mutiny/ambivalence) and as a source of pleasure (sadism), security (tethering), and downward social comparison (denigration). Even in lieu of total destruction, a degree of harm inflicted upon the other that far exceeds the degree of offense or disruption perpetrated by the other is inconsistent with

a motive of administering justice or restoring order (redress).

We therefore suspect that nihilistic hate may be most readily inferred in instances of “overkill.” In a close relationship context, for example, it is exceedingly difficult to argue that a jilted lover who mutilates the genitals of an unfaithful partner or murders an estranged partner and their shared children is motivated simply to correct an injustice or restore order (see, e.g., Fitness, 2001). In a broader context, overkill responses can be observed in the recklessness and rants of self-confessed “road ragers” (Lupton, 2002), in the actions of a medieval pope who exhumed and desecrated the body of his predecessor (Litwinski, 1945), in the hate crimes of “mission-oriented” perpetrators (McDevitt et al., 2001), and in the vitriolic verbal responses to persons peacefully opposed to capital punishment in the U.S. South (Vandiver, Giacomassi, & Gathje, 2002). Some of these acts are impulsive and relatively low cost, and others require a considerable amount of time, planning, and effort. Although none offers stand-alone proof of nihilistic hate, all seem to illustrate the fact that revenge and justice are only occasionally synonymous. Destruction of the other as an ultimate goal may therefore be the most parsimonious explanation for overkill behaviors.

Summary, Implications, and Research Directions

In this paper, we have attempted to answer two difficult questions: “What is love?” and “What is hate?”. In light of the strengths and weaknesses of extant conceptualizations of love, we propose that love involves valuing the other and is essentially a motive associated with the goal of preserving and promoting the other’s well-being. We suggest that conceptualizing love as a motive helps resolve a number of the problems associated with previous conceptualizations while retaining elements of their original focus. For example, our definition allows love to be experienced toward any valued object, including but not limited to other people, consistent with the breadth of usage of

“love” in lay language. Moreover, our motivational approach is not inconsistent with evolutionary perspectives and acknowledges the importance of the emotional antecedents, relational contexts, and behavioral consequences of the various forms of love. Finally, conceptualizing love in terms of valuing the other’s well-being allows us to differentiate it from the evaluation-based construct of liking, as well as from economic forms of interacting, neither of which requires that the other be valued.

We would suggest that our conceptual definition of hate as a motive associated with the goal of diminishing or destroying the other’s well-being likewise helps resolve problems associated with previous conceptualizations. Moreover, our approach provides theoretical continuity to an often fragmented and scattered hate literature and points to underlying commonalities among phenomena that might otherwise be seen as unrelated (e.g., hate crimes, road rage, institutional abuse, and domestic violence). As was the case for love, conceptualizing hate in terms of devaluing the object can accommodate the breadth of usage of “hate” in lay language and suggests that hate cannot be equated with dislike, however extreme, or with a purely pragmatic destructive intent. As a motive, hate is not the same as aggression, which is a behavior, nor should hate be confused with any of the emotions, such as anger, that can function as potential antecedents of the motive in its various forms. Finally, but by no means trivially, our motivational conceptualization of hate allows it to be contrasted directly with love in both its instrumental and ultimate forms.

In presenting love and hate as motives, we cannot emphasize too strongly that these motives are based on eliciting experiences that are often emotionally intense and profoundly impactful. These experiences, particularly the inherent emotions, energize the motives, giving love a richness of meaning and a depth of power that is unparalleled in human experience and giving hate its searingly destructive intensity.

We also need to emphasize that the distinct eliciting experiences that give love and

hate their unique forms should not be understood as mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, as stated earlier, we maintain that the different manifestations of love (or hate) can, and often do, occur in concert. For example, a common progression of relationship development sees relationships begin with the intense whirlwind of passionate love. Much like the booster rocket that sends a spacecraft into orbit, this initial stage of relationship formation is characterized by fiery emotional explosions of desire and longing. However, this intensity is soon burned out, perhaps replaced by a second stage of emotional propulsion as issues of commitment and adjustment drive the relationship forward and direct its course. Finally, with the relationship firmly established, it circles calmly in a repetitive orbit, only occasionally firing emotional retro-rockets to correct its trajectory.

Our model sets the stage for a more varied, less programmatic relationship progression in which different types of emotional experiences can propel a relationship forward at various points throughout its life span. We would not dispute that powerful, emotionally charged formative experiences that occur relatively early in the life span of a close relationship can set the stage for how a relationship progresses and grows. However, the emotional nature of these foundational experiences can vary. For example, we agree with Fisher et al. (2002) that the early stages of relationship formation may be most closely aligned with erotic love—the intense longing for a sexual and emotional union with a desirable mate. However, Fisher et al. have also characterized this mate-focused attraction as obsessive love, infatuation, or limerence. Indeed, when Fisher et al. identified 13 defining characteristics of romantic or passionate love, their list included intensified attraction in times of adversity, obsessive or intrusive thoughts about the partner, emotional dependency, and idealization of the partner's positive qualities, suggesting that the early stages of romantic or passionate love include dependence and regard as well as erotic love.

In addition to the dizzying whirlwind of desire, dependence, and idealization of romantic love, we believe that decisive turning

points in a courtship that are empathic in nature also may set in motion a focus on the experience and expression of altruistic love. Thus, compassion and caring may not be so much the warm afterglow that remains after the fires of passion have subsided, but an intense flame in its own right in the very early stages of a relationship. In essence, feeling another's joy and pain and reaching out to meet his/her needs can serve as the basis for a profound and powerful "love connection" in the long-term sense of the word.

We also contend that relationships in which altruistic love is an important early theme may be typified by enhanced concern for the partner's well-being and greater relational stability over time. In the event that altruistic relationships dissolve, a history of empathy and altruistic love may lessen the destructive impact of dissolution: Ex-partners whose relationship was based on a foundation of empathy may continue to care about each other and maintain a positive, if transformed, relationship. They may also be more inclined to feel that the relationship ended because they simply could not meet the other's needs and will therefore decide to bow out gracefully rather than act out the feelings of rejection likely to arise when passionate desire is thwarted, for example.

Although the foregoing examples have focused on love, a focus on eliciting experiences may similarly further our understanding of the origins and consequences of hate in its varied guises. Recognizing hate in its distinct forms and differentiating it from dislike and anger may help account for previous observations such as the apparent difficulty of identifying a hate prototype (Fitness, 2000; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993) or the differential prohibitions surrounding the experience and expression of hatred versus anger (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000).

Finally, we believe that love and hate, in their various manifestations, may also occur in close proximity, as in the ambivalence felt by an overworked and undersupported caregiver toward an infirm parent. The point is not to identify which form of love or hate a given individual or relationship may exhibit, for each will likely exhibit many forms. Rather, a more

profitable research goal is to identify and understand the factors and conditions under which the various eliciting experiences will occur and take root, and when different forms of love or hate will become salient and predominate. Ultimately, such investigations may assist in developing more effective interventions that will transform individuals from devalued to valued others in the eyes of perceivers—and in so doing, turn hate into love.

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